To understand the unprecedented Russian policy pivot and the choice for war, one has to understand, firstly, what happened to the breakaway entities post-cessation of active conflict; secondly, what happened to the dominant policy options for solving the conflict. Since the post Euromaidan term, The Ukrainian political elite became a hostage to its ultra nationalist elements that could not be reasoned with, but became veto players in peace negotiations. After the Orange Revolution, President Yushchenko and other Ukrainian leaders and intellectuals from western Ukraine advocated an ethnic, rather than civic, conception of the nation, emphasizing Ukrainian ethnicity and language. Also, during this period, some Ukrainian elites articulated an interpretation of Ukrainian history that, put in stark terms, viewed the past through Stalin’s crimes such as collectivization which produced the Great Famine of 1932 (the Holomodor). In this view, Ukraine is a victim of the imperialist Soviet Union which perpetrated genocide and destroyed Ukrainian language and culture. Their ideology fit in with a strand of ultranationalist discourse that, over the years, had scapegoated ethnic Russians for the country’s problems and identified them with the Soviet Union and Russia. After Maidan, Ukraine’s interim government did not criticize ultranationalist discourse, but instead appointed a former leader of a neo-fascist party, Andriy Parubiy, to the important post of head of Ukraine’s
National Security and Defense Council. More dangerously, as the violence heated up, Kiev allowed semi-private paramilitary groups—such as the far right, neo-Nazi Azov, Aidar Battalions—to fight in east Ukraine. These moves engendered fear among Russophones in the east that they would become targets and victims. The issues of conflict included language, identity and culture, fear of assimilation, threat posed by nationalist forces, future political evolution of the state, and the relations with Russia that many in Donbas wished to preserve. Goverment started to call them either seperatists or terrorists. In August 2021, Zelensky said in his televised address that those with a pro-Russia identity should leave for Russia because there would be ‘no happiness for these people here. Zelensky spoke in Russian to ensure that his message was heard. He was simply addressing his words to Russophones living in Donbas region. He had no other option since he was under the pressure of ultra nationalists. Zelensky resorted to draw support from nationalist forces, despite his different electoral promise. Thus they missed the chance to re-integrate Donetsk and Lugansk into "united Ukraine."
The main stumbling blocks in the Minsk Agreements were a constitutionally-guaranteed Special Status for Donbas and a return of control over the Russian – Ukrainian border to Kyiv. The other provisions included cessation of hostilities, exchange of all prisoners, a binding agreement on the distribution of powers between the centre and the ‘Special Status regions’ (NGCAs) with a permission for them to maintain their own police force in exchange for the centre’s prerogative to appoint judges and prosecutors. The other issue was organisation of a local election monitored by the OSCE and recognised by the international community, but the contention existed over which law should be used as the legal basis and the extent to which Ukrainian nationalists from outside the region would be able to disrupt the campaign, as the de facto authorities feared.
Special Status Law had weak advocates and strong opponents because it was to recognise Donbas as having more rights than others. Under the Special Status, the region’s legislatures could have more say in the adoption of new national laws if they affected their interests, such as on language and education. Moreover, the Special Status law would have had no legal force unless the Constitution was amended accordingly. However, the political class in Ukraine was not in the mood for decisive compromises, and the sense of national honour was so strong that it was blocking a substantive discussion on the Special Status bill under both Poroshenko and Zelensky’s presidencies.
Thus, non-implementation of the Minsk Agreements became one of the reasons for the decision for war. Certainly, the Donbas conflict was only one factor that led to it, but it was intimately connected to the Russia – West relations over European security and the perspective on Ukraine as a battleground in the West’s geopolitical competition with Russia.